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CoNTRAars - CONSIDERATION - FOIBEARANCE TO AssERT AN INVALID
CLAnmV.- Defendants leased oil and gas rights in a tract of land from
plaintiff. Later, defendants took a lease in part of these same mineral
rights by assignment from another. Plaintiff regarded tins latter act
as recognition of an adverse claim to Ins land and thought that it
constituted a transfer of fealty which created a cause of action on his
part. He threatened to sue. In consideration of plaintiff's forbearance
to assert this claim, the parties entered into an agreement whereby
plaintiff was guaranteed certain royalty interests. Plaintiff brought
this action to enforce the agreement. Defendants contended that the
plaintiff's forbearance was not sufficient consideration to support the
agreement. The trial court entered judgment for the plamtiff. Held:
Affirmed. Forbearance to sue on an invalid claim is sufficient con-
sideration to support a promise if the claim is asserted in good faith,
"unless the claim is so obviously unfounded that the assertion of
good faith would affront the intelligence of the ordinary and reason-
able layman."i Hall v. Fuller, 352 S.W.2d 559 (Ky 1962).
The court listed three views on the sufficiency of forbearance to
sue as consideration: (1) the claim must be legally enforceable; (2)
the clai must at least be doubtful, which view the court adopted;
(8) the clain need only be made in good faith.
The first view, that the claim must be legally enforceable, was
adhered to in the early English cases. The principle behind the view
was that forbearance to assert a void claim was not legal detriment 2
Although the claimant had the power to assert hns claim at law, he
was regarded as having a duty of imperfect obligation not to assert
an unfounded claim.3 Later the rule was relaxed, and forbearance to
prosecute a suit already instituted was held to be sufficient considera-
tion irrespective of its possible success or failure.4 These cases were
subsequently used in the development of the second view, i.e., for-
bearance to assert a doubtful claim is sufficient consideration. 5
Tins is the view adopted by the Kentucky court in the principal
case. A doubtful claim, as the court uses it, means a claim asserted in
good faith and with a reasonable belief in its validity This test is
actually no more than the good faith only rule, the third view, quali-
fied by an objective requisite. The Kentucky court has said "it is
1 Hall v. Fuller, 352 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Ky. 1962).
2 1 Williston, Contracts 471 (rev. ed. 1936).
3 Ibid. See also 1 Corbin, Contracts 434-35 (1950).
4 1 Williston, Contracts 471 n.3 (rev. ed. 1936).
5 1 Williston, Contracts 471-72 (rev. ed. 1936). Today, it appears that the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions refuse to follow the early English rule.
But see Renney v. Kimberly, 211 Ga. 396, 86 S.E.2d 217 (1955).
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easier to decide whether the claim was a doubtful one than it is to
ascertain whether the claimant was acting in good faith in asserting
it."6 A second reason in support of the doubtful rule is that the
objective requirement tends to prevent vexatious or fraudulent clans.7
The merit of the objective standard, however, should be considered
in the perspective of the good faith only rule.
All courts recognize that to constitute sufficient consideration, the
forbearance to assert an invalid claim must at least be made in good
faith.8 Anyone acting in good faith has the legal right to assert his
claim, even if it is completely groundless. To say that a claim brought
in good faith is groundless before it is adjudicated is to beg the
question; "it can hardly be said that there is any case known to man
in which a claimant has absolutely no chance of success."9 Since one
who asserts a claim in good faith has a legal right to prosecute it,
relinquishing that right is a detriment, 10 which is sufficient considera-
tion to support a contract. England 1 and many states12 have adopted
this approach. Since the benefit-detrument concept of consideration is
satisfied with the good faith only rule, should a court also require that
the claim be reasonable? Does this additional requisite make the rule
easier to apply and tend to prevent vexatious or fraudulent claims?
The rule laid down in the principal case is that the claim must
not be so obviously groundless that the assertion of good faith would
affront the intelligence of the ordinary and reasonable layman. How
much law does this objective standard require the layman to know?
The Kentucky court has not been consistent in answering this question.
In Hardins Admrs v. Hardin,3 the court points out that a doubtful
claim "must be one about which well-informed lawyers and judges
may easily differ, and about which the parties themselves do differ."14
In an earlier case' 5 the court held that the claim must be one about
6 Hardins Adinrs v. Hardin, 201 Ky. 310, 311, 256 S.W 417, 418 (1923).
7 Sellars v. Jones, 164 Ky. 458, 171 S.W 449 (1915).
8 1 Corbm, Contracts 436 (1950).
9 1 Corbm, Contracts 439 (1950).
10 "It is not the adequacy of consideration which controls m testing the
validity of the compromise agreement, for legal sufficiency does not depend on
comparative value. It is sufficient if there is something of detriment to one party
or benefit to the other, however slight." Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173, 176,
27 S.W.2d 695, 697 (1929).
11 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, [18701 5 Q.B. 449; Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S.
559, 121 Eng. Rep. 822 (K.B. 1861).
32 E.g., Mitchell v. Schulte, 142 Ark. 446, 222 S.W 365 (1920); Reed
v. Kansas Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 125 Kan. 603, 244 Pac. 1065 (1928); Butson
v. Misz, 81 Ore. 607, 160 Pac. 530 (1916).
'3201 Ky. 310, 256 S.W 417 (1923).
14 Id. at 313, 256 S.W at 419.
15 Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 130 Ky. 397, 113 S.W 456 (1908).
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which reasonable men at the time may have entertained a substantial
doubt. In Forsythe v. Rexroat,16 the court added to the confusion
surrounding the application of the doubtful rule by stating it is not
essential that the claim "be set up in particular terms sufficient to
withstand a demurrer."'
With such inconsistent views of what constitutes a reasonable
claim, certainly the doubtful rule is not easier to apply If these views
were crystalized into one standard, the doubtful rule would be less
difficult to apply Nevertheless, the reasonableness of the claim should
not be questioned. A court should be satisfied that the claun which
was withheld was reasonable because of the fact that the adverse
party respected it enough to enter into the contract. The only question
which should be presented to the court is whether the claim was in
fact asserted in good faith. Under this rule, the reasonableness of the
claim will necessarily become one of the factors in determining the
good faith of the claimant.
The other reason urged in support of the doubtful rule is that it
will prevent vexatious or fraudulent claims. However, there would be
no practical difference if the good faith only rule were applied. These
claims are, per se, not in good faith. By the use of this test the court
in the principal case would have achieved the same result since the
court indicated that the clann was treated seriously by all parties
concerned, including their lawyers, and that the claim was of more
than nuisance value.
Charles Samuel Whitehead
EvIDyENCE-REs GEsTA-Tmm ELEmrm r iN RAP.-The prosecutrix and
her husband lived in a remote section of the state. Upon arving
home one day with his employer, the husband found his wife visibly
nervous and excited. She told them she had been raped about an
hour before their arrival. This was her first opportunity to tell anyone,
and she told them immediately The trial court admitted the
employers testimony as substantive evidence and also permitted a
police officer to read into the record a statement which the prosecutrix
made to him about six hours after the event. Defendant appealed
from the conviction for rape. Held: Reversed. While the employers
testimony is properly admissible as part of the res gestae,1 the testi-
16234 Ky. 173, 27 S.W.2d 695 (1929).
17 Id. at 178, 27 S.W.2d at 698.
1 Technically, this statement is dictum, but for all practical purposes it is
holding.
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